An Important Mathematical Oversight

The original intention for this website was to encourage public awareness of an historical medical crime, one that has remained a tightly-kept British state secret now for more than five decades. The matter is of enormous public interest, not least because the motivation behind the crime itself was that of advancing scientific research into areas that would come to provide the seminal knowledge behind much of the technological progress of the last half-century. My investigation into the matter inspired a parallel enquiry into some of the fundamental principles that underpin that scientific and technological impulse.

There are therefore two principle concerns of this website, and if there is acknowledged to be a substantive connection between them, that has inevitably to do with late 20th Century developments in science and information technologies, and more broadly with the idea of an burgeoning technocracy – the suggestion of a growing alliance between corporate technology and state power – one that might be judged to have atrophied the powers conventionally assigned to liberal-democratic institutions. This link therefore serves as a segue to emphasise the equal importance, to my mind, of what is going on in the Xcetera section of the site, so that that section should not appear, from the point of view of the other, as some kind of afterthought.

Xcetera is concerned with a problem in mathematics and science to do with the way we think about numbers. As a subset of the category defined as integers, elements in the series of the natural numbers are generally held to represent quantities as their absolute, or ‘integral’, properties. It is argued that this conventional understanding of integers, which is the one widely held amongst mathematicians and scientists adopting mathematical principles, is the cause of a significant oversight with regard to changes in the relations of proportion between numerical values, i.e., when those values are transposed out of the decimal rational schema into alternative numerical radices such as those of binary, octal, and hexadecimal, etc.

On the page: The Limits of Rationality it is argued that the relations of proportion between integers are dictated principally by their membership of the restricted group of characters (0-9) as defined by the decimal rational schema; and that corresponding ratios of proportion cannot be assumed to apply between otherwise numerically equal values when transposed into alternative numerical radices having either reduced (as in binary or octal, for instance) or extended (as in hexadecimal) member-ranges.

This is shown to be objectively the case by the results published at: Radical Affinity and Variant Proportion in Natural Numbers, which show that for a series of exponential values in decimal, where the logarithmic ratios between those values are consistently equal to 1, the corresponding series of values when transposed into any radix from binary to nonary (base-9) results in logarithmic ratios having no consistent value at all, in each case producing a graph showing a series of variegated peaks and troughs displaying proportional inconsistency.

These findings are previously unacknowledged by mathematicians and information scientists alike, but the import of the findings is that, while the discrete values of individual integers transposed into alternative radices will be ostensibly equal across those radices, the ratios of proportion between those values will not be preserved, as these ratios must be determined uniquely according to the range of available digits within any respective radix (0-9 in decimal, 0-7 in octal, for instance); one consequence of which of course is the variable relative frequency (or ‘potentiality’) of specific individual digits when compared across radices. This observation has serious consequences in terms of its implications for the logical consistency of data produced within digital information systems, as the logic of those systems generally relies upon the seamless correspondence, not only of ‘integral’ values when transcribed between decimal and the aforementioned radices, but ultimately upon the relations of proportion between those values.

Information Science tends to treat the translation and recording of conventional analogue information into digital format unproblematically. The digital encoding of written, spoken, or visual information is seen to have little effect on the representational content of the message. The process is taken to be neutral, faithful, transparent. While the assessment of quantitative and qualitative differences at the level of the observable world necessarily entails assessments of proportion, the digital encoding of those assessments ultimately involves a reduction, at the level of machine code, to the form of a series of simple binary (or ‘logical’) distinctions between ‘1’ and ‘0’ – positive and negative. The process relies upon a tacit assumption that there exists such a level of fine-grained logical simplicity as the basis of a hierarchy of logical relationships, and which transcends all systems of conventional analogue (or indeed sensory) representation (be they linguistic, visual, sonic, or whatever); and that therefore we may break down these systems of representation to this level – the digital level – and then re-assemble them, as it were, without corruption. Logic is assumed to operate consistently without limits, as a sort of ‘ambient’ condition of information systems.

In the Xcetera section I am concerned to point out however that the logical relationship between ‘1’ and ‘0’ in a binary system (which equates in quantitative terms with what we understand as their proportional relationship) is derived specifically from their membership of a uniquely defined group of digits limited to two members. It does not derive from a set of transcendent logical principles arising elsewhere and having universal applicability (a proposition that, despite its apparent simplicity, may well come as a surprise to many mathematicians and information scientists alike).

As the proportional relationships affecting quantitative expressions within binary are uniquely and restrictively determined, they cannot be assumed to apply (with proportional consistency) to translations of the same expressions into decimal (or into any other number radix, such as octal, or hexadecimal). By extension therefore, the logical relationships within a binary system of codes, being subject to the same restrictive determinations, cannot therefore be applied with logical consistency to conventional analogue representations of the observable world, as this would be to invest binary code with a transcendent logical potential that it simply cannot possess – they may be applied to such representations, and the results may appear to be internally consistent, but they will certainly not be logically consistent with the world of objects.

The issue of a failure of logical consistency is one that concerns the relationships between data objects – it does not concern the specific accuracy or internal content of data objects themselves (just as the variation in proportion across radices concerns the dynamic relations between integers, rather than their specific ‘integral’ numerical values). This means that, from a conventional scientific-positivist perspective, which generally relies for its raw data upon information derived from discrete acts of measurement, the problem will be difficult to recognise or detect (as the data might well appear to possess internal consistency). One will however experience the effects of the failure (while being rather mystified as to its causes) in the lack of a reliable correspondence between expectations derived from data analyses, and real-world events.

So that’s some of what Xcetera is all about.. If you think you’re ‘ard enough!

S O M R

[ PDF version ]

PDF DOWNLOADS

Download my 173-page
report: Special Operations
in Medical Research
[pdf – 1.9MB]:

Download my Open Letter to the British Prime Minister & Health Secretary
[pdf – 363KB]:

The Limits of Rationality
(An important mathematical oversight)
[863KB]:

Radical Affinity and
Variant Proportion in
Natural Numbers
[2.53MB]:

Mind: Before & Beyond Computation
[643KB]:

Dawkins' Theory of Memetics – A Biological Assault on the Cultural
[508KB]:

Randomness, Non-
Randomness, & Structural Selectivity
[616KB]:

Special Operations in Medical Research: in Brief

The Surgical Abuse of Children within British Post-war Science and Medicine

On 9th April 1967, a week before my sixth birthday, I underwent a tonsillectomy procedure at the North Staffordshire Infirmary (now the University Hospital of North Staffordshire). Before 2001 I had no reason to doubt the authenticity of that procedure.¹ Since that time I have had occasions to undergo several MRI scan procedures in the UK, which have now revealed evidence that this was NOT a straightforward tonsillectomy procedure – the first, a Brain MRI scan conducted at St. Thomas' Hospital, London in 2008; the second, an MRI Head scan conducted at the National Hospital for Neurology & Neurosurgery, London in 2013. An image from the second scan is displayed below, and selected images from each scan are available to view as slideshows in the links below it:

MRI Head sagittal section (detail)

View slideshows of the scans: MRI-2 | MRI-1

The second scan appears to show a small rigid box-like structure (or structures), self-evidently of non-biological origin, approximately 1cm square, and situated behind the back of my throat close to the brain-stem; while the first scan appears to show an object, also of non-biological origin, situated within my neck to the left of my spinal column (‘right’ in the images).

Prior to either of these MRI scan procedures, my tonsillectomy in 1967 was the only occasion that I had had surgery under general anaesthetic – hence there can be no doubt that the operation was the occasion of these apparent illicit implants. Since the operation took place within the organisational perimeters of state healthcare provision, the evidence ultimately points to the UK Government’s culpability, through its Department of Health, in facilitating the plan and execution of a program of covert medical research (implicitly understood to be neuroscientific research), involving what can only be judged as the criminal exploitation of a number of vulnerable research subjects.²

Due to the highly sensitive nature of the evidence therefore, and the implicit threat to national security posed by the prospect of its revelation, public disclosure of the evidence has been rigorously suppressed across all UK institutions since the creation of the first MRI scan in October 2008. This means that no doctor has been prepared openly to discuss the evidence (even with myself) in a way that might be seen to corroborate the existence of the implants. That is to say that the evidence has been systematically covered-up by each of the hospitals responsible for producing the scans. Hence, for primarily political reasons, I have been unable to receive health assessment and care that fully ackowledges the truth of my medical condition as it is revealed by these MRI scans.³

Further evidence and analysis in support of these statements is presented in my personal report detailing my medical and family case history spanning the years 1967 to the present; and also in the Report section of this site. This includes some theoretical exploration of the technological drives and aspirations informing certain scientific endeavours during the period of the late sixties, and which had, as I understand, supplied the key motivation for this alleged covert research program; although it has to be said that, at this point in time, the bulk of the evidence relating to the precise utility of the research remains undisclosed and unavailable to me personally. Nevertheless, the manifestation of such a covert research program, as a scientific and technological imperative, in spite of its highly unethical nature, has to be understood on the basis that it promised access to knowledge of human neurological processes essential to the advancement of certain technological fields (in particular, that of Artificial Intelligence), but which, in 1967, was unobtainable by any other possible (i.e., ethical) means (for further elaboration see the page: Technological Imperatives).

The original radiological report on the first MRI scan made at St Thomas’ Hospital Radiology Dept. in October 2008 made no reference to the anomaly revealed in images 7.13-7.15 from the scan, concluding with the words: “No significant intracranial abnormality identified”. This resulted in my submitting a complaint to Guy’s & St Thomas’ (‘GSTT’) Complaints Dept., in March 2013, over the apparent attempts to cover-up this evidence by both St Thomas’ Radiology Dept., and subsequently also the Neurology Dept. at Guy’s Hospital (see: Complaint to GSTT for a detailed account of the progress of this complaint).

The same tendency towards reticence and denial affected the process of the reporting on the second MRI scan from the National Hospital for Neurology & Neurosurgery (NHNN – a part of UCLH NHS Trust), in March 2013. Again the reports were that the scan was basically “normal”, with no reference to the self-evident anomaly revealed in the 4-image scan sequence presented above. This resulted in a further complaint made to UCLH NHS Trust in November 2013 over the apparent cover-up of evidence within NHNN (see: 2nd MRI Head Scan for an account of the progress of this complaint).

Neither of these complaints had been satisfactorily resolved through the complaints processes internal to the two NHS Trusts, and each complaint was subsequently referred to the Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman (‘PHSO’). The PHSO declined to conduct an investigation of my complaint against GSTT on the basis that the complaint was ‘out of time’ (there was a gap of 27 months between my obtaining a copy of the MRI scan and making the complaint to GSTT); in spite of there being extenuating circumstances that seriously inhibited my ability to make a substantive complaint before March 2013, and in spite of the fact also that there were clear overriding reasons in the public interest for the PHSO to waive its standard 12-month time limit on the acceptance of a complaint (see my analysis of the PHSO’s decision).

The PHSO did agree to conduct an investigation into my complaint against UCLH NHS Trust. Following my receipt of the PHSO’s final investigation report on 04/04/2014, it transpired however that the PHSO was determined to conduct a crude and peremptory investigation into that complaint, relying upon the informal advice of one of its contracted medical advisors (not himself a specialist in neuroradiology, and an employee of the NHS, hence with questionable independence), given merely by word of mouth, and quoted only indirectly in the investigation report, and whom it appears had concurred with the opinions of the specialists at NHNN. From the conduct of its investigation, and its refusal to provide any challengeable verbatim statement of the medical advisor’s findings, together with the fact that the PHSO had declined to conduct a formal evaluation of the original MRI scan material itself, it is clear however that the PHSO’s intention all along was that of peremptorily dismissing the complaint, so that it appears to have been effectively complicit in the hospital’s original cover-up (see my analysis of the PHSO’s investigation).

In the face of this widespread and systematic refusal to countenance the evidence confirming my allegations over events in 1967, affecting not only the responses from specialist departments at several major hospitals, but also that of the chief health service regulator in the UK, one can only estimate that, in the face of so deeply serious an historical allegation against the NHS and against certain offices of the UK Government, there would inevitably be an extraordinary degree of institutional pressure operating against the disclosure of the evidence. The seriousness of the historical allegation over events in 1967, and which goes some way to explain the urgency behind recent attempts to cover-up the evidence, is that the event of my ‘tonsillectomy’ cannot be conceived as the responsibility of any single maleficent individual, but must be understood rather as an organised, collegial, and interdisciplinary enterprise, implicating the activities of various offices of state as well as scientific, health, and educational institutions, and backed by corporate investment.

In this context therefore, it is perhaps understandable that any individual medical expert, whether employed within the NHS or otherwise, would not dare to take on the initial responsibility for unilaterally disclosing the evidence, as to do so would be to invoke issues having a bearing upon national security, and would inevitably place that individual in a position of extreme personal vulnerability. This is in spite of the fact that the visual evidence is clear and distinct, even to an untrained eye.

My report points to the conclusion that this fraudulent experimental operation was sanctioned with my mother’s knowledge and consent, in exchange for the payment to her of significant financial remuneration. My father, however, was not party to this arrangement, and was kept in ignorance over the true nature of the operation, until his suspicions were aroused in response to anomalies in my appearance and in my behaviour during the months following the operation. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the untimely death of my father during surgery in May 1968, at the age of 41, was a consequence of him openly voicing his suspicions over the propriety of my tonsillectomy, at times aggressively to my mother, and subsequently his being expediently silenced through the combined actions of the family doctor and surgeons at the North Staffordshire Infirmary (for further elaboration, see the Evidence section of my report, pp.7-10).

In spite of the fact that since 1967 I have experienced chronic physical and mental ill-effects, in what now appear as the direct consequences of the event of my tonsillectomy, there was however no clear reason for me to suspect that something quite so extraordinary as this had taken place, all those years ago, until the year 2001, when certain aspects of evidence first came to my attention.

During the 23 years since this realisation, I have been engaged in the difficult process of collecting further evidence in support of these suspicions, though it has to be said that this has been an entirely self-directed and single-handed process, carried out against the persistent efforts by both the police and the medical profession to suppress and deny the evidence. Both the Metropolitan and Staffordshire Police forces have been in possession of partial evidence since 2003, and of conclusive evidence since January 2012, but have so far failed to make an appropriate response to it. This, in combination with the ongoing cover-ups by GSTT and UCLH NHS Trusts, suggests that both police forces, as well as diverse organisations within the NHS, have been complicit in the suppression of the evidence in accordance with the dictates of a sophisticated regime of secrecy operating from within the highest levels of state.

I first came into possession of a copy of the initial Brain MRI scan in December 2010, following a subject access request under the Data Protection Act to the Information Governance Dept. of St Thomas’ Hospital, in whose Radiology Dept. the scan had been conducted two years previously. My access to this material therefore presented the first serious risk of a public disclosure of this crucial prima facie evidence. At the same time I renewed my earlier allegations against certain members of my family who had benefitted financially from my mother’s original consent to the fraudulent ‘tonsillectomy’. Subsequently, there began a series of attempts on my life, both direct and indirect, and frequently involving attempts at poisoning (see the page: Attempts on My Life in the Report section). These attempts, from a variety of sources, were for the most part highly organised and sophisticated, and persisted initially from December 2010 through until the autumn of 2012, meaning that throughout that period I was forced to remain in hiding.

Following a period of relative, but not complete, respite in attempts on my life lasting about a year, towards the end of 2013 they began again, and I was forced urgently to depart the UK following a serious attempt to poison me at my flat in February 2014, once more having to maintain constant mobility and secrecy over my whereabouts. After returning to the UK in March 2015, I again experienced a period of relative reduction in the frequency of attempts on my life, until January 2016 that is, when they began again with a renewed urgency and intensity, forcing me to leave the UK once more in February 2016 (see the page: Applications for Political Asylum, also in the Report section, for an account of my applications for political asylum in Turkey, Norway, and Morocco, between October 2014 and November 2017).

I had previously during 2011 tried to alert the police several times (and periodically since that time) to material evidence of poisoning. However, on every occasion they have steadfastly ignored my reports and refused to accept or acknowledge the evidence. Both the police and the medical profession have relied repeatedly upon a false assertion that my claims were the product of a ‘delusional psychosis’, in order to distance those authorities from any serious factual consideration of the evidence (e.g., by doctors at St Thomas’ Hospital A&E Dept. refusing to take samples of my body fluids in order to ascertain evidence of poisoning); meaning that now for 14 years I have had no recourse to the law, or to health services, against a clearly evident series of attempts on my life. I am therefore effectively denied the rights to protection under the law, and to appropriate healthcare, which are fundamental rights enjoyed by any other British citizen regardless of circumstances, and so I have been forced to reside as a de facto refugee from the UK for the greater part of the period December 2010 to the present.

This persistent refusal across public services to respond appropriately to my allegations is not helped by the fact that any attempt at an initial, succinct communication of the content of these claims sounds bizarre and improbable, and indeed resembles a caricature of a classical delusional syndrome. The first response to my reports is therefore invariably one of massive incredulity, and a tendency to ‘switch off’ attention to subsequent assertions of the evidence which actually proves the allegations. There is a tendency towards reflexive denial in these responses which conveniently obscures on behalf of public services the fact that my expressed concerns over the nature of my tonsillectomy at age five are suspicions that have arisen only as careful and reasoned responses to available medical and other forms of evidence.

This routine scepticism affected the police response to the evidence I first presented to them, excluding the MRI evidence, 21 years ago in 2003. In subsequent anticipation of this recurrent response, and because these concerns have preoccupied my attention throughout the intervening period, it has been necessary to maintain myself in social and familial isolation; for it has not been possible to discuss these issues with anyone other than prospective figures of authority, or members of the medical or legal professions, upon whom I depended for acknowledgement of the evidence. However, even in spite of the existence of conclusive MRI evidence, it has repeatedly proven to be the case that none of those professionals has either the courage, or the independence, to openly discuss an issue of such extraordinary sensitivity (and horror), and therefore no one dares (in fear for their own personal security) to offer explicit corroboration of the evidence, settling instead for the prophylactic response that my claims must be ‘delusional’.

For this reason only, the evidence has remained officially undisclosed (or rather, in view of its publication here, uncorroborated). This has meant that it has been impossible to initiate any process of civil or criminal litigation in the UK as such a process would have depended upon the engagement of lawyers and the enlisting of expert opinion. In particular, the General Medical Council of the UK has dismissed the grounds for a complaint on the basis of the MRI evidence presented to it (in the absence of additional expert corroboration) for the reason that, as stated by the GMC in their final response to my complaint: “[W]e are not able to medically evaluate your scans” (see: Complaint to the GMC).

From the progress of my various complaints to the GMC; to the Police & the IPCC; to GSTT NHS Trust; and to UCLH NHS Trust over its more recent failure to disclose anomalies in the 2nd MRI scan; as well as each of my complaints to the Health Service Ombudsman (in relation to GSTT NHS Trust and to UCLH NHS Trust), detailed on these pages, it is apparent that all of those public bodies duty-bound to address my complaints are locked into a regime of systematic denial. The evidence disclosed reveals activities and undertakings within some of our most respected institutions which cannot be explained in manageable terms, as isolated instances of individual corruption or malfeasance, or otherwise in terms of bureaucratic failings; but which must rather be understood as an organised and interdisciplinary enterprise, executed among offices of state and diverse public institutions, and with calculated contempt for all ethical and humanitarian principles. This disclosure therefore forces one to invert the respect previously granted to a wide range of public institutions, as many of those institutions are revealed to have acted concertedly in defiance of common ethical standards; and to have done so it seems with the assurance that all ethical objections would ultimately be anulled through the exercise of executive state privilege.

In particular, the case is instructive for what it reveals about the status of children’s rights in an advanced liberal democracy such as that of the UK. For instance, it reveals how the status of ‘legal incompetence’ in which children rather helplessly find themselves may be exploited to facilitate (as in this particular case) the surgical ‘brain rape’ of a child for instrumental purposes, in the absence of the child’s knowledge or consent (but by soliciting the consent of one of its parents), while it is practically inconceivable that the same form of abuse could be successfully enacted against an adult (for further discussion on this point, see the subsection Consent on pp.37-41 of my report).

In addition to that, it follows from the analyses in Part 1 of my report (pp.26-32 & 41-46) that such an unprecedented and technically sophisticated program of experimental research would undoubtedly necessitate a massive financial investment. It is inconceivable in economic terms that such an investment might have been risked upon the fate of a single research subject. That is to say, there must have been other victims of the same form of experimental surgery in addition to myself – probably a select few – as a means of balancing the risk, but also as a means of ensuring a minimal degree of representative sampling in the research data. I have no idea of the identities or the fates of these other research subjects; however, it is clear that my own case is inextricably bound-up with a series of currently unreported cases. The disclosure of my own case would therefore act as a precursor for the subsequent exposition of all other cases – a circumstance that reinforces the institutional pressure working against public disclosure of my own ‘individual’ case, and which suggests the need for all related cases to be treated collectively, as a ‘class’.

Britain was at the time of these crimes against humanity a key signatory to such international protocols as The European Convention on Human Rights⁴, and the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki⁵. How is it then that the cynical contempt for these conventions evident in this particular abuse of the rights of a select group of children manages to remain perennially unnoticed, sequestered from the public conscience in a manner comparable to that of the interminable, Establishment-driven suppression of cases of historical sexual abuse of children, by members of the political elite no less?

My own case does not fit the paradigm of that of a ‘conventional’ case of sexual abuse (which ultimately may always be blamed on the personal moral aberrations of individuals); but rather exposes something altogether more sinister, cold, calculated, and organised. Crucially, it reveals something deeply troubling about the ability of adults, both individually and collectively, and under the pressure of a certain kind of instrumental authority, to suspend all considerations of the rights pertaining to children, as if those rights were merely ornamental and non-obligatory.

It is certainly true that ‘children’s rights’, commonly conceived, are categorically different from the human rights which are supposed to accrue universally to adults. The rights of children are habitually conceived in passive-only terms, as limitations on the behaviour and actions of adults towards children. That is to say, we commonly fail to consider the rights of children as it were ‘in their own inalienable right’, independently of that censoriousness towards the risk potential in our own behaviour as adults. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes no detailed provision for interpreting its articles with respect to the rights of children; hence the additional requirement for a Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was ratified by the UK in 1991. Despite this UN treaty being the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the world (or perhaps in explanation of that fact), it appears as a rather high-minded and self-congratulatory document that, having succeeding in establishing several laudable principles on which to formulate a theory of child rights (with an emphasis on protection), has very little to say about how these ideals might ever be realised, or why the lived experience of countless millions of children worldwide continues to fail to live up to these high expectations.

Few of us however seem to be willing to frame the question of the rights of children along the axis of autonomy (as children themselves might be inclined to do – see the discussion on autonomy in the subsection Consent, on pp.37-41 of my report). Hence, while the principle of individual autonomy must appear as a fundamental guiding principle in the design of any human rights legislation, the limits upon a child’s autonomy that we accept as natural, and as a protective necessity, are not compatible with the limits set socially upon an adult’s autonomy. This essential incompatibility makes problematic the assertion of ‘universality’ in any legal definition of the scope of human rights.

Human rights, therefore, do not accrue in any absolute or unqualified way to children who, after all, are deemed not to possess a competent human volition. In the absence of a competent volition, a child does not quite come to possess the attribute of ‘humanity’ in the fullest sense of the word. Human rights will only effectively accrue to those who may will to protect them. And clearly, we cannot trust adults with the protection of the rights of children. We cannot even trust a team of suitably qualified adults with the task of a sincere and sustained inquiry into the conduct of adults-with-power alleged to have historically abused children (the UK official Inquiry into cases of historical child abuse), without the integrity of that team being sabotaged from on high by malicious rumour-mongering operating in the service of the accused.

We ought then to take a less reactionary position on the issue of the rights of children – that is, one which derives less out of the twin impulses of vanity and shame. There would then be less of an insurmountable barrier to the open public acknowledgement and discussion of the undeniable evidence confirming the UK Government’s culpability in a series of historical medical atrocities, involving the surgical ‘brain rape’ of a select group of children, with a view to their lasting biological enslavement, for instrumental and technological ends, and within institutions providing state healthcare. Because essentially, without that discussion, no public body in the UK can claim with sincerity to have an interest in safeguarding the rights of children and in their actual protection from abuse by those individuals or institutions that maintain power over them.

With this in mind I sent copies of my first two MRI scans, plus my report and the covering letter linked below (similar to the contents of an earlier edition of this page), to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights on 04/11/2013. Corresponding submissions were also copied to each of: the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)⁶; and the World Medical Association, during October and November 2013. Similar correspondence was also sent to the office of UNICEF in the UK.

Letter to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – 04/11/2013 [pdf – 194KB]

After one week the World Medical Association returned the CD copies to me with a note to say that their organisation (which authored the 1964 Helsinki Declaration: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects) did not have the capacity (nor the motivation, it seems) to conduct any inquiry into the evidence supporting my allegations.

From February 2014, faced with a renewed resurgence of attempts on my life in the UK (see Attempts on My Life for more detail), and the inaction from the police in response to my reports to them, I was forced to urgently depart the UK once more. Hence, I became unable to access mail sent to my home address. The Director of the Office of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights responded to my November 2013 letter in May 2014 (letter dated 24/04/2014). However, I did not actually receive this letter until April 2015, following my next return to the UK. The response from the Director Isil Gachet was perfunctory, and served merely to excuse the Commissioner from any interest or action in response to my November 2013 letter by invoking the Commissioner’s mandate, which excludes the Commissioner from acting on behalf of individual complainants. The Director referred me instead to the services of the UK Parliamentary & Health Service Ombudsman:

Response from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – 24/04/2014 [pdf – 94KB]

I replied to the Director’s letter with the following on 25/04/2015 – a letter to which I have received no response during the 10 years since its date:

2nd Letter to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights – 25/04/2015 [pdf – 54KB]

It seems that the Commissioner’s Office had paid scant attention to the details of my original letter from November 2013, and had underestimated the scale and seriousness of the allegations made in it. In referring me to the PHSO it failed to appreciate the points made clear in my 2013 letter, that all attempts at procuring expert corroboration of the evidence had failed, and that the prospects for resolution by regulatory process at the national level were therefore slim. My second letter had the advantage however of describing the progress of both of my complaints to the PHSO, and of the poor judgement and apparent complicity of that office in declining to investigate the first complaint, and, despite agreeing to conduct an investigation into the second complaint, declining to uphold that complaint – that is without conducting a necessary formal evaluation of the original MRI scan evidence. My letter also stresses the point that, as I cannot realistically be considered an isolated victim in this affair, and as the public disclosure of my own case would appear as a necessary precursor to the subsequent exposition of all other currently unreported cases, then it is unreasonable for the Commissioner to refuse to act on the ground that he is not mandated to respond to individual cases.

By April 2016, having received no further response from the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, and having still received no response whatsoever from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, I assembled the combined complaint correspondence between myself and the two NHS Trusts, as well as the further correspondence between myself and the PHSO over those complaints, and submitted the complete correspondence afresh, together with annotated lists of the documents, to both the Commissioner’s office and the office of the OHCHR during April 2016.

There were, by this time, two further complaints, one submitted to each of the same NHS Trusts (GSTT and UCLH), with regard to communications sent by doctors working within the two Trusts in response to each of my earlier complaints. My complaints over the two cover-ups of evidence had resulted in letters being sent between doctors in the two Trusts, and between the Trusts and my GP, in which the written allegations detailed in each of the earlier complaints had been deliberately misrepresented, in order that is to furnish the alibi that I was suffering from a delusional mental illness. The letters were intended as referrals to the Community Mental Health Team (‘CMHT’); i.e., in order to invoke a psychiatric response from the CMHT as part of a strategy of defence, apparently shared between doctors across the two Trusts, against the serious allegations I had made against them.⁷

Each of the two additional complaints had in turn been subsequently referred to the PHSO, and my submissions to the Commissioner’s office and to the OHCHR in April 2016 took the form of formal complaints over the regulatory conduct of the PHSO, in view of its series of clearly fallible decisions, now aggravated following its completed investigation in that same month of my second complaint against GSTT, and its decision also not to uphold that complaint. The PHSO had managed to arrive at this decision only by blatantly disregarding key items of evidence presented to it, in a process seemingly driven by an implicit imperative to avert at all costs the PHSO’s natural obligation of arriving at a finding against the Trust. My letter of complaint to the OHCHR of 25/04/2016 may be accessed below:⁸

Formal complaint to OHCHR over the regulatory conduct of UK PHSO – 25/04/2016 [pdf – 291KB]

It ought to be apparent, from a full appraisal of the evidence submitted either to the Commissioner or to the OHCHR, that I am unable to pursue litigation within the UK in respect of my medical claims against several major hospitals due to a systematic state-wide policy of non-disclosure, affecting not only the actions of the hospitals themselves but also those of the principle regulatory bodies tasked to oversee the actions of the National Health Service (the GMC and the PHSO), and extending also to the actions of the police in response to criminal allegations made to them. Not only that, but I do not have the option either of seeking judicial reviews within the British courts against the decisions of any of these organisations, because experience has shown that no legal advisor is prepared to engage, in an open and frank way, in a discussion of the details of the evidence, when to publicly advance that evidence would lead rather inexorably to a crisis of national security. As any process of litigation at the national level would depend upon some form of unilateral corroboration of the evidence, and as no individual medical or legal expert has the courage to take on that responsibility, there is a clear imperative for some form of multilateral response at the international level. Otherwise, there can be no satisfactory resolution in the public interest of what, on any open and frank view, can only be interpreted as the most serious, most protracted, organised humanitarian atrocity perpetrated within a western European country since the end of the second world war.

In spite of the fact that my April 2016 submissions occurred nearly nine years ago, and in spite of the series of supplementary updates made to both organisations with regard to the PHSO’s still unresolved decision over my second complaint to UCLH, I have yet received no form of acknowledgement whatsoever from either the Council of Europe Commissioner’s office or the OHCHR (I had specifically requested that both offices respond to me only by email, since I had no reliable or safe access to mail sent to my home address).

Both the Commissioner’s office and the OHCHR are mandated to oversee and to investigate the actions of national regulatory bodies with respect to the exercise of humanitarian principles; and to receive formal complaints where there is evidence of the persistent abrogation of those principles by national institutions. The concerted refusal, by each of these organisations, to respond to just such evidence with respect to a series of decisions made by the PHSO is quite disconcerting, as it suggests that the principle ethical and human rights regulatory bodies within the EU and the UN are united with those of the UK in their intent to maintain non-disclosure of the evidence of these exceptional and unprecedented crimes against humanity. In view of this, one cannot avoid the conclusion that, in real terms, the exercise of international law in respect of humanitarian principles appears as a political instrument – as an arm of western ‘soft power’ – to be employed principally against nations and governments non-compliant to the collective will of elite western democracies, as a form of moral and political subordination, while at the same time both the Council of Europe and the United Nations are disinterested and effectively impotent towards applying the same principles rigorously amongst their own key member states.

28 November 2024

Footnotes:

The reasons for my suspicions over the propriety of my tonsillectomy operation being first aroused during the year 2001 are discussed in the Introduction to Part 1 (pp.4-6) of my personal report: Special Operations in Medical Research. For a deeper understanding of my justification for those suspicions as they emerged between 2001-3, see also the Evidence and Summations sections of Part 1 (pp.7-25, first written during 2003). [back]
The evidence discussed on these pages relates only to my own individual case of subjection to this alleged covert research program. The statement that a number of other such victims were also involved is largely speculative, as I have no direct knowledge of those cases. However, I have discussed on p.119 of my report that, in view of the inevitably massive financial investment that will have been involved in the design, planning, and execution of the research program, it is inconceivable in economic terms that such an investment might have been risked upon the fate of a single research subject. It is a necessary inference therefore that there were other victims in addition to myself, although the total number of cases is expected to have been few – probably in the order of a single figure. [back]
This circumstance has been exacerbated recently in respect of problems emerging in 2015 in the area of my thoracic spine/left scapula. In relation to these recent symptoms, in July 2020, while abroad, I arranged for an MRI scan to be made privately of my thoracic spine. This is discussed further at the page: C-Spine MRI Scan (July 2020), or on pp.72-82 of my report. As an update to this discussion of the evidence revealed in the UK MRI scans, I should add that following this more recent scan there is now visual evidence that appears to confirm speculations I first made 21 years ago (five years before the first MRI scan made in 2008) about the possibility of an additional illicit implant situated in the region of my thoracic spine. These speculations were first aired in the earliest edition of my report (see: Part 1, pages 17-19 & 29-31.) See also: Further Evidence in the Report section. [back]
The European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Rome, 4 Nov. 1950, and its Five Protocols: http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html [back]
World Medical Association, Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, adopted by the 18th WMA General Assembly Helsinki, Finland, June 1964 (amended by the WMA General Assembly, Seoul, Korea, October 2008). All editions of the Declaration are available at: https://www.wma.net/publications/wma-doh-1964-2014/ [back]
The Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences is the author of the document International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, CIOMS, Geneva, 2002: http://somr.info/lib/CIOMS_Ethical_Guidelines_2002.pdf [back]
I have chosen not to publish online the correspondence relating to these two additional complaints, as the material is openly defamatory and injurious to my character. Details of the correspondence are however discussed to some extent within a series of email updates sent to both the COE-CHR and OHCHR following my submission of formal complaints to each office in April 2016 (see: items 11-22 of the PDF folio referred to in the following note). [back]
The combined correspondence with both the Council of Europe Commissioner and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights between 2013-17 is available here as a PDF folio (excluding the attached evidences) – COE_OHCHR_corres_folio.pdf (22 items – 4.2MB). Between April 2016 and May 2017, there were six subsequent email updates sent to each office (items 11-22 in the folio); however to this date there has been no response from either office, either to my initial complaints, or to the subsequent updates. [back]